on the basis of the logic of syllogistic argument. I interpret the same syllogism differently, making the role of effect sizes once more an open issue.
No Proof of Validity: Problems in Affirming Consequences
The heading of the third column in Table 1 (Affirming consequent) is also the name of a logical fallacy, which should immediately raise suspicions about imposing either/or (binary) decisions when judging theories. The fallacy of affirming the consequent involves reasoning backward from the validity of conclusions to the presumed validity of their premises. Suppose someone claims that "if we follow the principles of supply-side economics, the economy will prosper" because "the election of a supply-side President caused economic prosperity." Among other interpretive problems (e.g., what does it mean to implement supply-side policies; what measure reveals the degree to which the President had in fact done so; and how should economic prosperity be measured?), there is a clear danger of spurious correlation: How can one be sure that prosperity was not caused by something else? It is also easy to see the danger of affirming the consequent from examples of fallacious reasoning such as the following: "If Hitler is still alive, the sun is hot." "The sun is hot." "Therefore Hitler is still alive."
Chow argued for all-or-nothing, dichototnous choices, even while using the word probably twice in the third column of Table 1, yet the reference to probability rather than to certainty is demanded by the fallacious nature of consequence-affirming arguments: Because it is logically false to conclude with deductive certainty that true premises are entailed by true consequences, then at best any evidence for the consequences' validity provides only arguments consistent with the validity of the premises. It is more accurate to say that experimental results are consistent with a hypothesis than to say that they confirm it.
No Proof of Invalidity: Problems with Modus Tollens Table I also misrepresents modus tollens logic in the second column, where T, is false misleadingly implies that a theory is Note. TI = theory of interest; /,, = one implication of T,; EFG = control and independent variables of the experiment; X = experimental expectation; A = set of auxiliary assumptions underlying the experiment; D = experimental outcomes (i.e., the pattern shown by the dependent variable in various conditions of the experiment). From "Significance Test or Effect Size?" by S. L. Chow, 1988 , Psychological Bulletin, 103, p. 107. Copyright 1988 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission.
deductively disproved by experimental results inconsistent with the theory. Chow (1988) stated that "if the experimental expectation is not met by the experimental outcomes (i.e., D is dissimilar to X), Implication/i , is refuted, thereby refuting the substantive theory, TI" (p. 108, emphases added). His statement ignores the fact that results can be inconsistent with a theory despite the theory's validity (e.g., because of unreliable measurement or incompetent investigators). As has often been noted (e.g., Cook & Campbell, 1979; Lakatos, 1970) , there are many ways to obtain null effect findings even when a theory is valid.
Chow's reference to Popper's (1968) book, Conjectures and Refutations, reflects the heavy emphasis on attempts to refute an hypothesis. Popper himself believed that too many theories, particularly in the social sciences, were constructed so loosely that they could be stretched to fit any conceivable set of experimental results, making them unfalsifiable and devoid of testable content. But Popper also recognized that falsification was never an either/or, all-or-nothing decision to be made with finality in a clean stroke. Indeed, Sir Karl Popper's (1959) classic treatise on the philosophy of science made that point early on:
In point of fact, no conclusive disproof of a theory can ever be produced; for it is always possible to say that the discrepancies which are asserted to exist between the experimental results and the theory are only apparent and that they will disappear with the advance of our understanding, (p. 50)
The same point has been well known for some time in the philosophy of science as a thesis first advanced by Duhem (1906 Duhem ( / 1954 and subsequently elaborated by Quine (1953) : "According to the 'Duhem-Quine' thesis, given sufficient imagination, any theory (whether consisting of one proposition or of a finite conjunction of many) can be permanently saved from 'refutation' by some suitable adjustment in the background knowledge in which it is embedded" (Lakatos, 1970, p. 184 ).
Yet it is true that a modus tollens syllogism does provide deductive certainty for the inference from (a) the failure to affirm the validity of the consequences to (b) the conclusion that there is a lack of validity within the premises. What, then, has gone awry? The answer is simple: Chow failed to indicate the difficulties that stem from a compound major premise involving the combination of the auxiliary assumptions about the experiment itself (A) with the pertinent theoretical implication under investigation (/,,). It is this compound, A.I,,, whose truth or falseness is tested. A.I,, is false actually stands for the following more complete expression: "It cannot be the case that the theoretical implication and the experimental assumptions are both true." By failing to separate A from /,,, Chow has misled any reader who does not notice that the falseness of either the assumptions, A, or the implication, /,,, makes it valid to state that their compound, A.I,,, is false.
Interpreting a null outcome is notoriously difficult, but Chow's account regarding column 2 of Table 1 sweeps such difficulties under the rug. Knowing that assumptions about (a) the appropriateness of the experimental arrangements (on the one hand) and (b) the validity of the theoretical implication being tested (on the other hand) cannot both be true, one may still have trouble determining on which of these two sides the error lies. If the compound premise is falsified, then one of the two elements of that premise (A or / n ), or perhaps even both elements, must be false; unfortunately, that logic cannot identify which element is false. Even if one affirms the theory and assumes that the error is in the auxiliary assumptions (A), one is not much more well informed, because so many auxiliary assumptions are made whenever an experiment is conducted.
Implications for Judgments About Scientific Theories
Chow questioned whether statistical analyses could tell us anything other than "Yes, you should continue to support this theory," or "No, you should not continue to support this theory." Is it legitimate for such things as effect sizes to affect the degree of confidence in a theory? Chow (1988) implied that effect sizes should be disregarded because they are unnecessary for dividing the world into two mutually exclusive alternatives:
The magnitude of the experimental effect is treated in a binary manner even though it numerically is a continuous variable. That is, the magnitude is relevant only in deciding whether the result falls within the region of rejection (of the null hypothesis) or without. The magnitude of the effect size is irrelevant once the region is determined. Hence, it is misleading to make statements like "Although the effect is statistically significant, it is nonetheless very small." This statement is misleading because it misrepresents the binary nature of the statistical decision, (p. 108)
Chow's insistence on binary decisions arises from his mistaken belief that modus tollens logic can provide deductive certainty about the validity of a theory. Without such certainty, that is, without a firm logical basis for demanding an either/or decision about the theory's validity, there may yet be some role for effect sizes, and the wholesale condemnation of using effect sizes to gain information would seem at least somewhat premature.
Nevertheless, progress in many scientific fields seems to stem from experiments in which one theory is refuted and another is vindicated. Thus Plait's (1964) famous paper, Strong Inference, whose subheading indicated that "certain systematic methods of scientific thinking may produce much more rapid progress than others" (p. 347), emphasizes the following step in an inferential chain of reasoning: "devising a crucial experiment (or several of them), with alternative outcomes, each of which will, as nearly as possible, exclude one or more of the hypotheses" (p. 347). Platt (1964) reiterated time and again the need for results to eliminate at least one among several possibilities: "Any conclusion that is not an exclusion is insecure and must be rechecked" (p. 347); "the theorists in this [highly productive] field take pride in trying to predict new properties or new particles explicitly enough so that if they are not found the theories will fall" (p. 349). "There is no point in making hypotheses that are not falsifiable" (Platt, 1964, p. 350) .
Here, then, is the crux of a seeming paradox: On the one hand, the strict application of modus tollens logic specifies that no theoretical implication can be deductively refuted. On the other hand, the winnowing process of distinguishing poor theories from better theories cannot proceed without some grounds for exclusion and elimination. Rapid progress within the most highly developed fields of science, moreover, seems to proceed by means of some such winnowing mechanism.
The paradox's resolution lies in first distinguishing between deductive and inductive reasoning. Chow's use of modus tollens involves an appeal to deductive certainty, which, unfortunately, is an inapplicable criterion for ruling between theories. Platt (1964) also saw the need for rejecting some theories, but he proposed that Bacon's (1620 Bacon's ( /1960 ) description of induction provides the proper means. Platt (1964) thought that Bacon's most important contribution was "the conditional inductive tree, which proceeded from alternative hypotheses. . . through crucial experiments . . . to exclusion of some alternatives and adoption of what is left" (p. 349). Indeed, Platt (1964) insisted that "strong inference is just the simple and old-fashioned method of inductive inference that goes back to Francis Bacon" (P. 347).
Logicians have known since Hume's analysis that induction, because it can never provide absolute certainty, is an unending task. As a path is followed along the branches of a conditional inductive tree, however, a theory can eventually come to rest on such a shaky limb of the tree that, as judged by the members of a scientific community, its foundation will not support the search for further fruits of knowledge. At such a point, consensus emerges that the particular path should be abandoned, and hence progress is made by the process of elimination. This ref-
erence to consensus suggests that Plait's (1964) account mighl well be elaborated along ihe lines suggested by sociologists of science (e.g., Pelz & Andrews, 1976) or by a social construclionisl perspective (cf. McGuire, 1980) .
Induction and the Use of Effect Sizes

Why Effect Sizes Are Sometimes Misleading
A close examination of the inductive process has implications for Ihe use of significance tests and effect sizes. This examination should begin with the distinction between (a) applied experiments, for which the "agricultural model of science" is appropriate (see Chow, 1988, p. 107), and (b) what Chow calls theory-corroborating experimentation, which has features that make the agricultural model inappropriate.
The key aspect of these features, according to Chow, is that the investigator seeking to corroborate a theory is not interested in the experimental question for its own sake. The magnitude of association between the independent and dependent variables is not of interest; rather, "the magnitude is relevant only in deciding whether the result falls within the region of rejection (of the null hypothesis) or without" (Chow, 1988, p. 108) . A closely related reason for Chow's (1988) argument concerning the irrelevance of effect sizes is that "the experimental manipulation may be remote from the property of the underlying mechanism" (p. 109).
The remoteness of manipulations from properties of underlying mechanisms should be farm'liar to psychologists. Consider two well-known experiments (Aronson & Mills, 1959; Gerard & Mathewson, 1966) designed to test a dissonance theory prediction about the extent to which people will use rationalization and self-justification. The prediction was that such tendencies would increase with the degree of suffering that people willingly endure in order to participate in an activity, particularly when the activity turns out to be of questionable value; in short, suffering leads to liking, because people are inclined to justify their sacrifices ("no pain, no gain").
Aronson and Mills (1959) manipulated suffering via embarrassment (i.e., female subjects read to male experimenters written material that varied by condition in its explicit sexual content), whereas the Gerard and Mathewson (1966) experiment used differences in the strength of electric shock to manipulate suffering. Clearly, nothing of substantive impact vis-a-vis the theory of dissonance itself should be inferred from the relative effect sizes obtained from embarrassing people versus shocking them.
The magnitude of an effect size can also depend on theoretically irrelevant properties of the test situation. The extent to which erotic material read by women to men would cause embarrassment for the women, for example, might well be of less magnitude today than it was when Aronson and Mills (1959) conducted their experiment. Nevertheless, a greatly reduced effect size obtained from replicating the experiment today would not count as a disconfirmation of dissonance theory if the weakened impact of the manipulation were thus traced to cultural changes.
This example indicates Chow's (1988) reasoning behind the following statement: "Consequently, the magnitude of the effect size in an experiment is not necessarily a quantitative index of a theoretical property of the underlying mechanism. An investigator may be misled, however, to think otherwise if the emphasis is on the magnitude of the effect-size estimate" (p. 109).
Chow was right, yet his presentation misleads investigators in a different fashion by insisting on binary decisions rather than by specifying that there are circumstances under which magnitude estimations may serve as admissible evidence and may assist strong inductive inference with respect to even the most theoretical of hypotheses.
Why Effect Sizes Are Often Helpful
Specifying the proper use of effect sizes in tests of theoretical hypotheses requires reexamining the choices that scientists face. A binary decision based on a significance test is only a tentative choice between directions in which further search might be conducted, not a final choice among theories or between a given theory and chance. The nature of this tentative choice is binary only in a limited way. In particular, failure to obtain conventional levels of significance leads to a search among a series of choices. These choices can be binary at each node of the inductive tree, but pursuit of the no-difference effect's true cause (i.e., invalid theory or invalid auxiliary assumptions) across a set of choice points leads to considering more than two possibilities in all.
For example, Cook and Campbell (1979) (d) random irrelevancies in the setting were adequately controlled; and (e) irrelevant characteristics idiosyncratic to the experimental "units" (e.g., subjects' individual differences) were adequately controlled. Cook and Campbell (1979) also mentioned applying certain "standards . . . [with which to] estimate the confidence that can be placed in 'accepting' the null hypothesis" (p. 45). One set of standards, for example, is applicable "when point estimates of the size of a desired effect are available (e.g., we want an increase of more than 2% on one variable or an increase of at least ten points on some other)" (Cook & Campbell, 1979, p. 45 ). Chow's analysis reminds us that this is typically not the case with tests of a purely theoretical hypothesis, as opposed to some practical question. Yet other standards do apply in theoretical contexts. For example, "it is possible to conclude with considerable confidence that the derived effect was not obtained" in cases in which "the results are statistically significant and in the opposite direction to that specified in the hypothesis or when the results, though not statistically reliable, are contrary to the derived prediction and are found in a vast majority of reasonably powerful subgroup analyses, e.g., at different sites" (Cook & Campbell, 1979, p. 45 ).
This latter situation suggests how null-effect results must be tracked across multiple nodes of a conditional inductive tree.
As Cook and Campbell (1979) pointed out, "even when the results are opposite to what was expected, it is still useful to check whether influential suppressor variables might be obscuring a smaller true effect in the predicted direction" (p. 45). Their example concerns an applied problem, namely, the possibility that "true effects of compensatory education programs have been obscured in past research because the experimental groups receiving compensatory treatments came from economically poorer homes than did the more affluent control group children whose parents' incomes made them ineligible for the compensatory program" (Cook & Campbell, 1979, p. 45) .
Nonetheless, similar suppressor effects might operate in tests of pure theory.
Consider, for example, an investigator whose determination to disprove dissonance theory created experimenter expectancy effects of sufficient strength to negate the attitudinal impact of dissonance that would otherwise have been experienced by the subjects. This example, along with Cook and Campbell's (1979) reference to suppressor variables obscuring a smaller true effect (a reference necessitating a comparison regarding the strength of two types of effects, suppressor and true), provides a clue to one way in which the use of effect sizes would have value even in tests of pure theory: By maintaining a record of effect sizes rather than simply recording the binary decision yielded from a significance test, one may later be in a position to estimate whether a significant result might otherwise have been obtained with the original data. Similarly, information about the degree of unreliability characterizing the available measures, along with information about effect sizes, helps to estimate when a true effect might have been obscured by measurement error.
Indeed, Cook and Campbell (1979) Arguing that "it is advisable for purposes of statistical conclusion validity to use as many as possible of the following design features" (Cook & Campbell, 1979, p. 49 ), Cook and Campbell provided a list of seven features that includes such items as using pretest measures and matching prior to randomization, as well as having subjects serve as their own controls.
Notably, after listing these seven design features, Cook and Campbell (1979) continued as follows: (8) Estimates of the desired magnitude of effect should be elicited, where possible, before the research begins. Even when no such estimate can be determined, (9) the absolute magnitude of a treatment effect should be presented so that readers can infer for themselves whether a statistically reliable effect is so small as to be practically insignificant or whether a nonreliable effect is so large as to merit further research with more powerful statistical analyses, (p. 49) This advice contrasts sharply with Chow's (1988) , which opines that "it is misleading to make statements like 'Although the effect is statistically significant, it is nonetheless small'" (p. 108). Despite Chow's insistence, the logic of applying Cook and Campbell's (1979) line of reasoning to a search process along a conditional inductive tree suggests that there may indeed be value to examining effect sizes. When a null effect is obtained, Chow's logic table implies that the only two choices are (a) the theory is untenable because the predicted effect does not exist or (b) the effect exists but, because of an error or errors in the auxiliary assumptions, has not been detected. The advantage of Cook and Campbell's approach, on the other hand, is that it breaks down Choice (b) into a number of subsidiary considerations (reasons why a true effect might have remained undetected). Each of these subsidiary considerations can be examined by specifying further choice nodes (e.g., either the theory is untenable or inadequate statistical power was used) and their corresponding syllogisms. An illustrative syllogism is as follows: (a) If inadequate statistical power accounted for the initial failure to confirm existence of the predicted effect, then the effect should be obtained once ample power is used; (b) what constitutes ample power can be specified in terms of conventions about beta; (c) therefore, if a revised experiment uses the specified level of beta and still fails to find evidence consistent with the existence of the predicted effect, then there is one more reason to doubt that the theory is valid.
It is essential to recognize that none of these syllogisms can ever support with deductive certainty the conclusion that the theory is wrong. That is, it is impossible to prove with deductive certainty that an hypothesized effect does not exist, for the simple reason that it is always logically possible to postulate a hidden factor operating to obscure true effects. But although an infinite regress is logically possible, that type of impasse can be avoided by introducing some practical considerations and rules of thumb. Indeed, the very use of probability itself, along with the adoption of conventions such as those regarding levels of probability that will be deemed significant, illustrates the importance of such considerations and heuristics.
Science and Crucial Experiments
The practice of good science clearly has a place for pitting theories against one another in what are regarded as crucial experiments. Anyone who remains unconvinced should read Plait's (1964) account, which abounds with examples from some of the most obviously successful sciences. Yet what is not so obvious from Plait's account is what went into regarding those experiments as crucial, and it is here also that Chow's account is primarily misleading. Advances in some fields seem to occur with amazing rapidity only because countless auxiliary hypotheses, whose acceptance is essential to the logic behind declaring decisive a test between theories, have already been examined in previous investigations. It is the sum total of those investigations that is really being put to the test when the binary choice between two competing theories is conducted and a winner declared. The very declaration of a winner, in fact, often obscures the extent to which support for the adopted conclusion rests on working assumptions about the successfulness of those previous investigations. The importance of these working assumptions gets prominent attention in accounts of the philosophy of science that emphasize the role of social construction in research and the role of research programs or research traditions (e.g., Gholson & Barker, 1985; Lakatos, 1970; Laudan, 1981) .
Choices among theories are undergirded by "working" assumptions, in two senses of that word. First, they are of necessity eternally tentative and probabilistic. But second, and more importantly, they are assumptions that seem to have worked in the past; that is, although they can never be proven conclusively, they have jibed sufficiently with past experience so that scientists are willing to place their bets on them in the future.
Only by conceiving the scientific decision-making process in such terms will scientists begin to discern the proper roles of significance tests and effect sizes. In particular, for some working assumptions, one will definitely want to have a quantifiable estimate of how well they have worked in the past, precisely the type of information that effect sizes can provide. Alternative explanations that involve postulating the operation of some artifactual or spurious factor (e.g., experimenter expectancy effects) are instances in which such effect-size information would be helpful. When one already has, for the type of investigation being conducted, information that the typical magnitude of effect sizes contributed by experimenter expectancy effects is small, then obtaining an effect size substantially greater than that amount (i.e., what would otherwise be attributed to experimenter bias alone) adds to one's confidence that the effect is due to the manipulated treatment.
This account of the scientific method should be familiar: The task of rendering alternative (potentially confounding) explanations implausible greets scientists daily in laboratory and field. Nevertheless, standard practice regarding significance tests has clouded scientists' vision and led them to believe that there is something magical in these tests. This temptation should be resisted; significance tests do not make decisions:
All that a significant result implies is that one has observed something relatively unlikely given the hypothetical situation. Everything else is a matter of what one does with this information. Statistical significance is a statement about the likelihood of the observed result, nothing else. It does not guarantee that something important, or even meaningful, has been found. (Hays, 1973, p. 384) What one does with information about the relative likelihood of an observed event will vary with the situation. As was indicated by Platt (1964) , in some situations, scientists will use tactics such as agreement about conventional levels of significance in making what they consider to be a decisive choice between competing accounts of nature. In other instances, however, the shakiness of some of the supporting conclusions will cause scientists to defer judgment. Those circumstances are the ones in which it would be better to treat a significance level not as an arbiter of binary choices but as merely an indicant of probabilities.
Both significance tests and effect sizes will continue to play a role in science. My purpose has been to discuss some aspects of logic so that the role of each can be discussed with greater clarity in the future.
